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BEYOND THE “NATURE” OF DATA:
OBSTACLES TO PROTECTING SENSITIVE
INFORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES
Müge Fazlioglu*
ABSTRACT

Privacy and data protection laws in both the European Union and
the United States impose heightened obligations on data controllers
and processors that handle data deemed to be of a “sensitive” nature,
such as health information, financial information, and information
concerning minors. But the central assumptions that underlie these
special protections, imposed through various laws on both sides of the
Atlantic, have lagged behind modernization and technological
advancements.
The current scheme of sensitive data protection faces three primary
obstacles, which, taken together, show that prioritization of sensitive
information is no longer sufficient on its own to deal with the most
significant privacy risks to individuals. The first challenge is the rapid
growth in data-collecting technologies, which have led to the
emergence of new types of data. This new information can range
from behavioral data produced by online activity and collected by
social networking sites, to geolocation data produced by cell phone
and other smart devices that monitor users’ movements and activities.
The second challenge, closely related to the first, is that nonidentifiable, non-sensitive types of data can still be linked to an
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identity or used to reveal or infer sensitive data using innovative
analytic techniques. Many datasets that attempt to anonymize or deidentify data — that is, tools that expunge personally-identifying
information such as names, addresses, or dates of birth — may still be
combined with other datasets to re-identify individuals. The third and
final obstacle is that the “sensitivity” of a given piece of information
can change depending on the context of its use. This means that the
sensitivity level of a piece of data is not solely a function of its nature
or type, but also of the way in which it is used or the ends for which it
is utilized. Thus, privacy and data protection laws that assume
sensitivity is a static quality of certain data types are not in sync with
the reality of data use.
This Article concludes by suggesting ways policymakers can
rethink the prioritization of sensitive information and address newlyemerging risks to information privacy. Relying entirely on the
sensitivity level of a piece of data to determine the risks associated
with it will fall short of adequately protecting data subjects’ privacy.
Data controllers and regulators must therefore consider other factors,
in addition to the category of data or its sensitivity level, such as
whether it can be used in combination with other publicly-available
data to uniquely identify a person, the likelihood it can be linked to or
reveal sensitive data about a person, and the context of the data use,
when determining the risks posed by data processing. Laws also
ought to extend protection to newly-emerging types of data that are
sensitive in nature, such as web-browsing histories and longitudinal
location data. Law and policymakers should ultimately move beyond
the category-based regulation of data to effectively protect privacy
today.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy and data protection laws in both the European Union and
the United States impose conditions on the processing of certain
kinds of personally identifying information, referred to as sensitive
data, sensitive information, or special categories of information. The
sensitivity of a given piece of information is often used to determine
how much legal protection should be afforded to it. This is because
greater consequences are likely to result from the misuse of sensitive
information compared to misuse of less sensitive or non-sensitive
information. Thus, information sensitivity is associated with risk.
Indeed, protecting sensitive data has become one of the most
important issues in the domain of risk management in recent years.
The categories of information that data protection and privacy laws
have tended to recognize as sensitive include health data, financial
data, and other types of information considered to be of an intimate
or personal nature. The exposure of these types of information is
thought to bring about the most severe kinds of privacy harms. And
yet, we live in an era where almost any piece of data about a person,
sensitive or not, can be linked to their identity. Further, innocuous
bits of information can be aggregated from multiple sources that,
when observed as a whole, reveal sensitive attributes about a person.
Laws that treat certain types of information as warranting heightened
legal obligations, therefore, may ultimately fail to adequately protect
privacy if they ignore how non-sensitive data can be linked to
sensitive data. This Article focuses on understanding why making this
link is so vital and what can be done to incorporate a more nuanced
conceptualization of the categorization of sensitive data in privacy
and data protection law and policymaking.
Ultimately, the reality of a technologically- and data-dependent
world means that lawmakers face an uphill battle and must be willing
to continuously evaluate and potentially expand the list of data types
that receive heightened legal protections. Additionally, lawmakers
must address the way in which seemingly innocuous pieces of
information can be connected to sensitive types of data, as
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developments in technology and big data have diminished the utility
of the longstanding divide between sensitive and non-sensitive data.
In line with this concern, policymakers must also reconsider the
effectiveness of current approaches to data protection, most of which
prioritize information solely according to its nature, type, or category.
Additionally, lawmakers should account for whether the data can be
readily combined with other publicly-available information to
uniquely identify a person, the likelihood that it can be linked to or
reveal sensitive information, and the context of data use when
determining what legal protections should be afforded to it.
Before analyzing these obstacles and discussing ways of addressing
them, Part I of this Article explains why certain types of information,
such as health or financial data, merit heightened legal protections
and impose heavier obligations on data processors, collectors, and
providers. This is done by focusing on the levels of risk associated
with certain types of data across the United States and European
Union. Part II of this piece dives into the myriad obstacles that exist
in protecting sensitive data, examining how current legal protections
are insufficient.
Additionally, Part II discusses why proper
protections for sensitive information are so vital. Part III suggests
various ways in which policymakers ought to rethink sensitive data,
and the kind of impact this rethinking can have on privacy rights and
data protections.
I. PRIORITIZING SENSITIVE DATA
This Article begins by explaining why the severity of privacy harms
that arise from misuse of sensitive data are often greater than the
privacy harms associated with misuse of non-sensitive types of data.
It then examines the reliance of privacy and data protection laws on
the type, nature, or category of information to prioritize protection.
Laws that prioritize sensitive information rely on assumptions about
data that are being invalidated by innovative developments in
technology and data use. More specifically, a purely categorical
approach to privacy and data protection fails to recognize the risks
generated by the expansion in data collection practices and
technologies. Assumptions made by policymakers and legislators in
both the European Union and the United States about managing the
risks associated with certain types of data thus need to be revisited
with these emerging threats to privacy in mind.
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A. Why Processing Sensitive Data Is Assumed to Entail More Risk
The sensitivity of a given piece of information is often defined as a
function of the magnitude and severity of the risks associated with its
processing. For example, one set of guidelines on handling sensitive
health information defines it as “information that carries with it
Similarly,
unusually high risks in the event of disclosure.” 1
experimental studies surrounding privacy attitudes and behaviors
have demonstrated that individuals’ perceptions of information
sensitivity are positively correlated with their perceptions of risk or
exposure, or the heightened need for privacy. 2 It is well-recognized
that the processing of sensitive information, if not handled properly,
“can lead to significant forms of harm [to individuals] . . . [and] is the
kind that exposes the data subject to a high probability of such
harm.” 3
Indeed, a key difference between sensitive and non-sensitive
information is the level of risk associated with disclosure of the
information. For example, as Professor Scott Skinner-Thompson
explained, intimate information and political information 4 “tend, by
their nature, to involve higher likelihood of downstream

1. LYGEIA RICCIARDI, CONSUMER P’SHIP FOR EHEALTH, THE NAT’L P’SHIP FOR
WOMEN & FAMILIES, PROTECTING SENSITIVE HEALTH INFORMATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 2
(June 2010),
http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Sensitive-DataFinal_070710_2.pdf?docID=7041 [https://perma.cc/NK5F-9BHJ].
2. Multiple studies provide empirical support for the hypothesis that consumers’
assessment of the sensitivity of personal data is positively correlated with their risk
perceptions of information disclosure. See, e.g., Ardion Beldad et al., I Trust Not

Therefore It Must Be Risky: Determinants of the Perceived Risks of Disclosing
Personal Data for E-Government Transactions, 27 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2233,
2237 (2011); He Li et al., Examining Individuals’ Adoption of Healthcare Wearable
Devices: An Empirical Study from Privacy Calculus Perspective, 88 INT’L J. MED.

INFORMATICS 8, 8 (2016).
3. Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (2015); see
also Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(1)
[hereinafter GDPR] (defining “data subject,” a common term used in the fields of
data analytics, as anyone who can be identified, whether through direct or indirect
means, by reference to information “such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural
person”).
4. These refer to “sexual, medical, or mental health information” and
“information arguably pertaining to countermajoritarian viewpoints,” respectively.
Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015).
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consequences (such as employment discrimination resulting from the
disclosed intimate information or marginalization caused by the
monitoring of political thought) that they are entitled to special
protection relative to other forms of information.” 5 In other words,
the main consideration in whether a certain type of data should
receive heightened legal protection tends to be determined by the
likelihood and severity of the harms that can arise from its misuse.
This association between data sensitivity and privacy risk helps to
explain why both EU and U.S. laws impose heightened obligations on
entities that process and control data subjects’ sensitive information.6
Several EU resolutions stipulate that special rules should govern the
processing of sensitive information in view of the damage that
individuals might suffer in case of misuse. 7 As early as 1995, the Data
Protection Directive prohibited processing special categories of
personal information; more recently, the 2018 General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) expanded on several new conditions
for this kind of sensitive data protection. 8
Article 4 of the GDPR provides definitions for terms found
throughout the regulation, which are also common in privacy and
data protection discussions, such as personal data, consent, and
profiling. 9 Notably, the GDPR makes a nuanced distinction between
controllers and processers, imposing a unique set of requirements
upon each. 10 A controller is defined as any “natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with
others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of

5. Id. (“Doctrinally, strict scrutiny is warranted because political thought and
intimate information are closely related to already-recognized fundamental rights
such as marital privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom of association . . . [thus, U.S.
courts] appear more open to informational privacy claims when the dissemination of
certain categories of information presages direct, downstream consequences, such as
potential discrimination.”).
6. See Note from the Presidency to the Council of the European Union
16525/1/12 REV 1, Data Protection Package: Report on the Progress Achieved
Under
the
Cyprus
Presidency
7
(Dec.
3,
2012),
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2016525%202012%20REV
%201 [https://perma.cc/7Q2L-AWP2].
7. Éloïse Gratton, If Personal Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, Then Risk of

Harm the Key: A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as Personal
Information, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH 105, 151 (2014).
8. See generally GDPR, supra note 3, pmbl. While the 1995 Data Protection

Directive needed to be transposed into Member State law, the GDPR is directly
applicable to them.
9. Id. art. 4.
10. See id. art. 24–43.
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personal data,” 11 while a processor is any such entity that processes
data on behalf of a controller. 12 Under the GDPR, controllers tend
to have greater responsibilities to assess and mitigate the risks of data
processing, 13 defined as “any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or
not by automated means.” 14 Under this expansive definition, the
range of operations falling within the scope of processing includes
collecting, recording, organizing, structuring, storing, adapting or
altering, retrieving, consulting, using, disclosing by transmission,
disseminating or otherwise making available, aligning or combining,
restricting, erasing, and destroying data. 15
As noted in the GDPR’s recitals, the purpose of which is to express
“concise reasons” for the law, 16 one of the underlying rationales for
granting specific protection to sensitive information is that
“[p]ersonal data which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in
relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, merit specific protection
as the context of their processing could create significant risks to
fundamental rights and freedoms.” 17
Processing information that is sensitive in nature is also deemed
riskier under U.S. law. For example, guidance on implementing the
E-Government Act of 2002 indicates that the addition of health or
financial information to a database “raises the risks to personal
privacy” and requires the agency to conduct a Privacy Impact
Assessment. 18 Other legislation and regulatory guidelines on the
application of risk-based approaches to data protection further
suggest accounting for the nature of personal information in assessing
data processing risks. 19

11. Id. art. 4(7).
12. Id. art. 4(8).
13. Id. art. 24.
14. Id. art. 4(2).
15. Id.
16. See Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission for Persons Involved in the Drafting of European Union Legislation 31,
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3879747d-7a3c411b-a3a0-55c14e2ba732/language-en [https://perma.cc/3Y9L-8S4N].
17. GDPR, supra note 3, Recital 51.
18. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB M03-22, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES: OMB GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE
E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 Attachment A, § II(B)(b)(9) (2003).
19. See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Statement on the Role of a Risk-Based
Approach in Data Protection Legal Frameworks (May 30, 2014),
see
also
https://www.pdp.ie/docs/10046.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4HV-X5GV];
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Finally, in both the European Union and the United States,
sensitive data is thought to warrant extra protection to “avoid the risk
of discrimination” based on their use by third parties. 20 Indeed, legal
scholars have noted the “strong kin between data protection and
discrimination issues,” 21 because data protection rights and nondiscrimination rights share a common goal — guaranteeing fairness
and reducing the imbalance of power between private individuals and
powerful outside actors who might violate their rights. 22 In sum, the
heavy obligations that come with processing sensitive information
stem from the assumption that misuse of sensitive data is likely to
have greater consequences for fundamental rights and freedoms than
misuses of other, non-sensitive types of data. 23
B. Legal Protections for Sensitive Data
Privacy and data protection laws and policies in both the European
Union and the United States impose higher obligations upon the
processing of certain types of information, referred to as special
categories of information, sensitive information, or sensitive data.
Yet, on both sides of the Atlantic, legislative bodies have taken an
“ad hoc, anecdotal approach to defining sensitive information, [and]

Addendum to Note from the Presidency to the Council 10227/13 ADD 1, Subject:
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) (May 31, 2013),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2013/06/st10227ad01.en13.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5S3-LNYH].
20. Yves Poullet, About the E-Privacy Directive: Towards a Third Generation of
Data Protection Legislation, in DATA PROTECTION IN A PROFILED WORLD 4 (Serge
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2010); see also Daniel L. Metayer & Julien Le Clainche, From

the Protection of Data to the Protection of Individuals: Extending the Application of
Non-Discrimination Principles, in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: IN GOOD

HEALTH? 322, 328 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that data protection
rights and non-discrimination rights share a common goal of guaranteeing fairness
and reducing the imbalance of power between individuals and actors who may violate
their rights).
21. Raphaël Gellert et al., A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Discrimination and
Data Protection Legislations, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 61 (Bart Custers et al.
eds., 2013).
22. See Metayer & Le Clainche, supra note 20, at 322; Poullet, supra note 20, at 4.
23. See generally PETER P. SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL CONCEPTS,
LAWS AND PRACTICES 68 (2012); Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Advice Paper on
Special Categories of Data (“Sensitive Data”), Ref. Ares (2011) 444105, 4 (Apr. 8,
2011), https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88417.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YJ5-Y3SA]
[hereinafter Sensitive Data].
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the categories they define as sensitive change very slowly and
infrequently.” 24 Moreover, significant discrepancies exist between
U.S. and EU law in terms of the categories of information that are
considered sensitive. For example, although U.S. courts are unlikely
to recognize political opinions or beliefs as a type of sensitive data
due, at least in part, to First Amendment concerns, such data is
explicitly protected under European law. 25 Nonetheless, as the
ensuing sections of this Article seek to demonstrate, both EU and
U.S. privacy and data protection laws assume that certain categories
of information carry specific risks.
The following sections describe particular provisions within EU
and U.S. law that protect special categories of information. In the
European Union, these include Convention 108, the 1995 Data
Protection Directive, and the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). In the United States, these include the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), and
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

1. Special Categories of Information in EU Law
The European Union imposes heightened legal obligations on
processing sensitive data based on what has been called a
“categorical” classification scheme, meaning that certain types of
information are always treated as sensitive. 26 This idea — that
sensitive information is distinct in kind from other kinds of
information, and therefore requires extra protections — was
expressed in the European Union’s earliest data protection laws.27
Indeed, special legal protections for sensitive information processing
have been in effect since Convention 108 first “ritualised” this by

24. Ohm, supra note 3, at 1141. Two famous examples from U.S. law include the
1998 Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) and the 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act (DPPA). It is generally accepted that the VPPA was created “almost entirely
because a reporter obtained the video rental records for Judge Robert Bork during
his confirmation hearings regarding his doomed nomination to the Supreme Court,”
while the DPPA was “inspired directly by the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer,
killed by a deranged fan who located her using records he purchased from the
California DMV.” Id. at 1140–41.
25. GDPR, supra note 3, art. 9.
26. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 86 (2014).
27. Sensitive Data, supra note 23, at 8.
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reference to sensitive data in 1981, 28 thereby enshrining sensitivity as
a “pivotal element of all further regulations regarding the use of
personal data.” 29 This Convention prohibited processing information
that reveals a person’s race, political and religious beliefs, health,
sexual life, or criminal records in the absence of appropriate legal
protection, which the Member States had to provide through law. 30
Both the 1995 Data Protection Directive (“the Directive”) and the
GDPR, which went into force on May 25, 2018, strengthened
protections for the discrete list of data types referred to as special
categories of information. 31 Two specific provisions, Article 8 of the
Directive and Article 9 of the GDPR, provide protections to special
categories of information. By examining each in turn, it is possible to
understand the boundaries of sensitive information and the rules
around its processing in the EU.
The 1995 Data Protection Directive served as the fundamental
framework for data protection in the European Union for over two
decades, establishing the groundwork for rules controlling sensitive
information processing. 32 In Article 8, the Directive allowed Member
States to prohibit the processing of special categories of personal
data, defined as information that may reveal “racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and . . . data concerning health, and sex life.” 33 Article 8
also contained a list of exceptions to the prohibition, such as explicit
consent, necessity, protecting vital and legitimate interests of

28. SPIROS SIMITIS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REVISITING SENSITIVE DATA: REVIEW
OF THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO
AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA 1, 1–2 (1999). In line with Convention

108, British, Dutch, and Spanish laws each grant sensitive data “special status.” Id.
Although some EU countries, including Austria and Germany, have resisted
“abstract categorizations of personal data,” such as religious information or
philosophical information, by promoting a context-oriented appreciation for data
sensitivity, they were forced to surrender this position in the face of the 1995 Data
Protection Directive’s explicit list of sensitive information, which was transposed into
the laws of the Member States. Id. at 2.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, art. 6 (Jan. 28,
1981), https://rm.coe.int/16800ca434 [https://perma.cc/GE5F-R3UE].
31. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 26, at 36.
32. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) [hereinafter Data
Protection Directive].
33. Id.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

281

individuals, and public interest. 34 As Professor Spiros Simitis argues,
Member States constantly challenged the exhaustive categories of
sensitive data in the Directive by “attempts to either bypass or to
review the apparently definite list,” 35 resulting in a “virtually endless
list of exceptions” that undermined the protections for sensitive
information. 36
The idea of granting special protection to sensitive information was
strengthened when the GDPR, which repealed the Directive, came
into force in mid-2018. 37 Like Convention 108 and the Directive,
Article 9 of the GDPR prohibits processing special categories of
information. Article 9(1) prohibits processing personal data that
would reveal a person’s “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership.” 38 The
same provision goes on to prohibit processing “genetic data [or]
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person,” and provides that processing of “data concerning health or
data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall
be prohibited.” 39
The GDPR builds on the foundation of the laws that came before
it by defining and including protections for new types of sensitive
information, 40 such as data concerning health, 41 genetic data, 42 and
biometric data that uniquely identifies a person, 43 and recognizes the
sensitivity of information regarding sexual orientation. 44 The GDPR

34. Id. art. 8(5).
35. SIMITIS, supra note 28, at 3.
36. Id. at 3–4.
37. Id.; GDPR, supra note 3, art. 94(1).
38. GDPR, supra note 3, art. 9(1).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The GDPR defines the phrase concerning health as “personal data related to
the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health
care services, which reveal information about his or her health status.” Id. art. 4(15).
42. Genetic data is defined as “personal data relating to the inherited or acquired
genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the
physiology or the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from
an analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question.” Id. art. 4(13).
Regarding DNA information, the European Court of Human Rights has suggested
that it reveals information about ethnic origin, which renders it “sensitive.” S. &
Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 196.
43. Biometric data is defined as “personal data resulting from specific technical
processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a
natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural
person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data.” GDPR, supra note 3, art. 4(14).
44. Id. art. 9(1).
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also introduces measures to protect children’s information. 45 For
example, information services geared specifically to children under
the age of sixteen are not lawful without parental consent, 46 given
that children may be less cognizant of the risks of data processing and
The GDPR further requires special
their respective rights. 47
attention from supervisory authorities and data controllers toward
online services or advertisements directed towards children. 48 Data
controllers are responsible for showing “reasonable efforts to verify”
The need to provide transparency when
parental consent. 49
processing children’s information is also included in the GDPR
where, as a rule of general applicability, it requires that procedures
regarding the use of information should be written in “clear and plain
language,” a point reemphasized in the context of processing
children’s information. 50
Although the GDPR is directly applicable to all EU Member
States, it also provides room for the States to adopt more stringent
rules on processing special categories of data. 51 Thus, Member States
can introduce “further conditions, including limitations” on the
processing of “genetic data, biometric data or data concerning
health.” 52 Member States may also create laws that lower the age
requirements on processing children’s data, on the condition that the
age not be below thirteen years. 53
While the EU’s omnibus laws, such as the GDPR, apply to all
entities that process data, whether public or private, the United States
has adopted a “sectoral” approach towards data protection and
privacy law — different laws regulate specific industries or uses of
technology. 54 The following section examines comparable U.S. laws
and how they subject certain types of information processing to
heightened obligations.

Id. Recital 38.
Id. art. 8(1).
Id. Recital 38.
Id. art. 57(1)(b).
Id. art. 8(2).
Id. Recital 58.
Id. Recital 10.
Id. art. 9(4).
Id. art. 8(1).
See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information
in the United States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 879–908 (2014).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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2. Information Subject to Heightened Obligations Under U.S. Law
The categories of information subjected to heightened obligations
in the United States “are often [categories] which would be
considered as being of ‘intimate’ nature,” such as personal health
information. 55 In contrast to EU law, nowhere in U.S. privacy law
can there be found an explicit list of categories of sensitive
information. Rather, “narrow sectoral laws” in the United States are
targeted at specific industries. 56 Thus, determining what information
qualifies as sensitive data under U.S. law can only be done in a
roundabout way through an examination of the various sectoral laws.
Examining various sectoral laws can help identify sensitive types of
data based on the sectors that have been regulated, as U.S. privacy
laws impose higher obligations on processing certain types of
information in certain contexts. For instance, U.S. law subjects the
processing and use of financial information, students’ educational
information, health information, and information about children to
detailed regulations. To understand how U.S. law delineates the
boundaries of sensitive information, this section briefly examines
these sector-specific federal laws: HIPAA, FERPA, COPPA, GLBA,
and FCRA.
Health information, which concerns the “inner workings of one’s
body or mind,” is accorded higher protection under U.S. law because
invasions of privacy in this realm may violate one’s “individual sense
of self.” 57 Recognizing a growing need to protect private health data
“in the face of digital distribution of health information,” 58 Congress
enacted HIPAA.
HIPAA is a federal law that provides nationwide protection for
“individually identifiable health information.” 59 The Privacy Rule of
HIPAA aims to ensure individuals’ rights to control all forms of their
health information (oral, written, and electronic) by regulating the
ways other entities access and use this information. 60 It imposes

55. See, e.g., Gratton, supra note 7, at 165; Skinner-Thompson, supra note 4, at
162.
56. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 881.
57. SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 23, at 67.
58. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 283, 302–03 (2003).
59. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 1177, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (1996).
60. See Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV.
(2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-forconsumers/index.html [https://perma.cc/SYA9-NSPQ].
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standardized rules on “covered entities,” which include health plans,
healthcare providers, and healthcare clearing houses. 61 The Privacy
Rule grants individuals “the right to inspect, review, and receive a
copy of their medical records and billing records that are held by
health plans and health care providers” covered by the rule. 62 In
addition, HIPAA’s Security Rule requires covered entities to
consider the probability and severity of potential risks to the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of protected electronic
health information.
Students’ educational records also receive special protection in the
United States. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) prohibits federally-funded institutions from disclosing
students’ education records without parents’ or eligible students’
consent. 63 The law defines education records as “records, files,
documents, and other materials” that involve information “directly
related to a student” and “maintained by an educational agency or
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution”
involved in the description of education records. 64 More specifically,
education records include information about grades, attendance,
disciplinary actions and course lists, as well as health and
immunization records. 65 Health information about students held by a
university clinic, for example, would fall under FERPA’s protection
of “treatment records” but excluded from coverage under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule. 66
Like the EU, the U.S. privacy framework recognizes the
importance of protecting children’s information. The fundamental
aim of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998

61. See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV.
(2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/lawsregulations/index.html [https://perma.cc/LY9J-SLPA].
62. See Your Medical Records, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/medical-records/index.html
[https://perma.cc/GWW4-A3LF].
63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2018).
64. Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
65. See Questions and Answers About Education Records, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/daca-education-records.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BX2F-ERDB].
66. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., JOINT
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND
PRIVACY ACT (FERPA) AND THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA) TO STUDENT HEALTH RECORDS 2 (2008),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FC4-WA6X].
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(COPPA) is to protect children from the risks of data collection
through websites or mobile apps, and to engage parents in the
process. 67 COPPA subjects website operators and online service
providers directed at children under the age of thirteen, as well as
general audience websites and online services (such as mobile apps)
that knowingly collect personal information from children under the
age of thirteen, to specific rules such as posting detailed privacy
notices. 68 In addition, operators are required to notify parents and
obtain their permission before collecting or sharing certain
information regarding their children. 69
Personal information is broadly defined under COPPA: names,
addresses, online contact information, user names that include
contact information (such as an e-mail address), Social Security
Numbers, “persistent identifiers” that allow recognition across
different services, geo-location information that allows the
identification of the child’s street name or city, and any “photograph,
video, or audio file, where such file contains a child’s image or
voice.” 70 It is of note that states can expand these protections.
California, for example, recognizes a child’s limited right to be
forgotten — minors maintain the right to request that certain content
be removed from websites, social networking sites, mobile apps, and
other online services. 71
Another industry subject to privacy and data protection regulations
is the financial sector. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
applies to U.S. companies that are significantly engaged “in financial
activities” and requires them to implement varying security programs
that contain safeguards depending on the size, complexity, nature,
and scope of their activities. 72 These programs should identify and
assess risks to consumer information and evaluate the effectiveness of

67. See Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complyingcoppa-frequently-asked-questions#General%20Questions [https://perma.cc/G5XZ7BDH].
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(A)(1) (2012).
69. Id.
70. See Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 67.
71. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–81 (2019).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO06-674, PERSONAL INFORMATION: KEY FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS DO NOT REQUIRE
INFORMATION RESELLERS TO SAFEGUARD ALL SENSITIVE DATA (2006),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06674/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-674.htm [https://perma.cc/T24N-4SGQ].
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current safeguards for controlling these risks. 73 The GBLA’s privacy
protection applies to “nonpublic personal information,” which it
specifically
defines
as
“personally
identifiable
financial
information.” 74 The effectiveness of the GLBA in protecting nonpublic financial information, however, has been heavily criticized.75
For example, the Act enables entities to share what might be
considered sensitive information with affiliates and non-affiliates by
utilizing notice and opt-out mechanisms. 76
The last U.S. law discussed here is the FCRA, which provides
protection for a very particular type of financial information:
consumer reports. 77 Because a person’s credit rating in the United
States influences his or her loan eligibility, interest rates, or ability to
rent a home, 78 consumer reports are afforded special protection
under U.S. law. The FCRA is limited in scope — it applies only to
consumer reporting agencies directly involved in creating consumer
reports that will be used to evaluate individuals for the purposes of
employment or credit. 79 Its main aim is to promote the accuracy and
privacy of information regarding consumers. 80
As the preceding sections demonstrate, laws in both the European
Union and United States single out certain types of information or
sectors as “sensitive,” which are thereby deserving of heightened legal
protections. These include health information, information about
children and students, and financial information. Thus, both legal
systems rely on determinations about the nature, type, or category of
information to assess its sensitivity and riskiness. However, as Part II
argues, this approach is beset by several challenges that it will be
unable to address. Although prioritizing sensitive data lies at the core
of laws that protect individual privacy, this approach is being
rendered ineffective by innovative techniques of data collection,
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012).
75. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219,
1230 (2002) (“The GLB Act has managed to disappoint both industry leaders and
privacy advocates alike.”).
76. See §§ 6802(a)–(b), 6802(b)(2).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
78. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW
AND POLICY 268 (2016) (“Financial privacy is an important topic because of
Americans’ deep dependence on the credit system.”).
79. See Credit Reporting, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/privacy-and-security/credit-reporting [https://perma.cc/2WK7VP7Q].
80. Id.
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processing, and analysis. In an era characterized by new and
unexpected uses of data, privacy and data protection laws are lagging
years behind.
The next Part addresses three main challenges to the current
approach of laws that prioritize sensitive data by category. This
Article maintains that these challenges should prompt law and
policymakers to reconsider ways of protecting privacy in the era of
big data. Further, certain types of data no longer exist in isolation
and thus ought not be guarded in isolation. As explained in the
following Parts of this Article, new technologies and innovative data
analytic techniques have created novel types of data, which are as
worthy of protection as the traditionally-recognized categories of
sensitive data, while also blurring the lines between sensitive and nonsensitive data. Moreover, lawmakers now must contend with the
challenge of accounting for the ways in which the context of use for a
given piece of personal information can influence its level of
sensitivity. This Article concludes that these developments have
rendered the current scheme of legal protections based on type,
nature, or category of information as rather weak and ineffective,
which leaves data subjects exposed to significant privacy risks.
II. CHALLENGES TO PROTECTING SENSITIVE DATA BY CATEGORY
As demonstrated in the previous section, the type, nature, or
category of data — and the accompanying assumptions about the
greater riskiness of sensitive kinds of data — have been used to
calibrate legal obligations for data controllers and processors in both
the European Union and the United States. 81 However, there are
several reasons why using categorical distinctions to prioritize data
determined to be “sensitive” or “high risk” may not protect
individuals from the entire spectrum of privacy risks they face today.
The following sections discuss three practical challenges to laws
that prioritize sensitive information. The first challenge concerns the
growth in data-collecting technologies, which have led to the
emergence of new types of data. 82 This new information can range

81. Numerous empirical studies have found that consumers’ assessments of the
sensitivity of personal data are positively correlated with their risk perceptions of
information disclosure. See, e.g., Beldad et al., supra note 2, at 2233.
82. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES 1, 4 (2014); see also Liran Einav & Jonathan D. Levin, The
Data Revolution and Economic Analysis 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19035, 2013) [hereinafter BIG DATA] (explaining that “data is
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from behavioral data produced by online activity and collected by
social networking sites, to geolocation data produced by cell phone
and other smart devices that monitor users’ movements and
activities. 83 These developments in data require lawmakers to
constantly reevaluate and expand the list of information that can be
considered “sensitive,” complicating how these data can be properly
protected.
A second, related challenge is that seemingly-innocuous, nonsensitive, and non-identifiable types of data can be linked to an
identity, or to other sensitive data, using innovative analytic
techniques. 84 Many datasets that anonymize or de-identify data —
that is, tools that remove personally-identifying information such as
names, addresses, or dates of birth from existing data — may be
combined with other datasets to re-identify individuals. 85 The rise in
the number of large, publicly-available datasets, even those that do
not themselves contain any identifying or sensitive data, presents a
risk to informational privacy.
A third obstacle is that the “sensitivity” of a given piece of
information can change depending on the context of its use — the
same piece of information might be sensitive in one context but not in
another. In other words, the sensitivity of data might not be a
function solely of its nature or type, but also of the way in which it is
utilized or the ends to which it is put. 86 With this concern,
policymakers must reconsider the effectiveness of the longstanding
approach that prioritizes information according to nature, type, or
category. Rather, policymakers must take into account the context of
data use when crafting privacy and data protection laws.

now available faster, has greater coverage and scope, and includes new types of
observations and measurements that previously were not available”).
83. See generally Nicole Perlroth & Nick Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
15,
2012),
Without
Permission,
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/google-and-mobile-apps-take-data-bookswithout-permission/ [https://perma.cc/Y3LV-BKEM].
84. See BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 8 (“When data is initially linked to an
individual or device, some privacy-protective technology seeks to remove this
linkage, or ‘de-identify’ personally identifiable information — but equally effective
techniques exist to pull the pieces back together through ‘re-identification.’”).
85. See id.
86. ÉLOÏSE GRATTON, UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL INFORMATION: MANAGING
PRIVACY RISKS 413 (2013).
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A. Ubiquitous Collection and the Ever-Expanding Categories of
Sensitive Data
The rate at which personal information is being shared, stored, and
analyzed has reached unprecedented levels, ever-expanding in scope
and magnitude. Today, toys “converse” with children, 87 contact
lenses analyze glucose levels in tears, 88 and clothes embedded with
smart devices respond to touch commands. 89 The sheer amount of
data that is being generated also continues to increase in ways that
defy imagination. In 2016, Dropbox users uploaded over 833,000
files, Instagram users liked nearly 2.5 million posts, Netflix
subscribers streamed over 86,000 hours of video, and over 3.5 million
text messages were sent in the United States alone, for every minute
of every day. 90 Moreover, new forms of data about people, such as
real-time data on their movements, preferences, and behaviors, are
being collected by a growing number of interconnected devices: “The
declining cost of collection, storage, and processing of data, combined
with new sources of data like sensors, cameras, geospatial and other
observational technologies, means that we live in a world of nearubiquitous data collection.” 91
Individuals are also producing more and more data about
themselves throughout the course of their daily activities. People
share both sensitive and non-sensitive information with software and
87. Cayla is a toy that can “talk and interact, . . . play games, share photos, read
stories . . . [and] can answer almost any question.”
This Is Cayla,
https://www.myfriendcayla.com/meet-cayla-c8hw
MYFRIENDCAYLA.COM,
[https://perma.cc/AQ89-LRQ4].
88. See Jonah Comstock, Novartis CEO Comments, New Patent Shed Light on
Google’s Contact Lens Projects, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/46600/novartis-ceo-comments-new-patent-shedDigital
light-on-googles-contact-lens-projects
[https://perma.cc/L3EY-J4DR];
MED.
FUTURIST,
Contact
Lenses
Can Transform
Diabetes
Care,
http://medicalfuturist.com/googles-amazing-digital-contact-lens-can-transformdiabetes-care/ [https://perma.cc/W9AJ-Q87U] (noting that, with the use of embedded
sensors and wireless antenna communicating the information to external devices,
blood glucose levels in tears will be analyzed and the data transmitted to an
associated app, which will notify users to act or contact their doctors according to the
results).
89. See David Pierce, Google Is Hacking Our Clothes to Work Like
Touchscreens, WIRED (May 29, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/google-wantsturn-everything-wearable/ [https://perma.cc/82Z2-HLBT] (“Google is working on an
ecosystem of apps and services that will let you interact with your phone and other
gadgets just by grabbing, tapping, swiping, and touching your clothes.”).
90. Data Never Sleeps 4.0, DOMO (2016), https://web-assets.domo.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/16_domo_data-never-sleeps-4-2.png [https://perma.cc/8AJUXPLV].
91. BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 4.
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application providers when using their smart devices. 92 Given the
real and perceived benefits accrued by using these devices and
services, people voluntarily disclose sensitive information, such as
data regarding their medication intake, dietary habits, or levels of
fitness to app providers. 93 People who use health and fitness apps, for
example, continuously provide information in real-time about their
movements, 94 exercise habits and physical activity levels, 95 how much
water they drink, 96 as well as how anxious or stressed 97 they feel at
various times throughout the day. People who use online dating apps
typically share their location, photos, and information about their
hobbies and interests, with the intention of finding an agreeable
partner nearby. 98 Apps used for mobile banking and other financial
services collect sensitive financial information, such as Social Security
Numbers, account numbers, and salary information, as well as various
kinds of biometric behavioral data. 99
It is of note that websites and app providers may collect more
sensitive information than they need to merely function. For
example, one of the most-downloaded gaming apps in recent years,

92. See generally Tien Wang et al., Intention to Disclose Personal Information
Via Mobile Applications: A Privacy Calculus Perspective, 36 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT.

531 (2016).
93. One study shows that two-thirds of Americans favor using these digital tools
to manage their health. See Two-Thirds of Americans in Favor of Digital Personal
IMAGING
TECH.
NEWS
(Feb.
24,
2015),
Health
Management,
https://www.itnonline.com/content/two-thirds-americans-favor-digital-personalhealth-management [https://perma.cc/TN53-GBDJ].
94. See,
e.g.,
Steps
—
Activity
Tracker,
ITUNES,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/steps-pedometer-step-counter/id708359518?mt=8
[https://perma.cc/YW8H-DLDS].
95. See
Daily
Yoga,
GOOGLEPLAY,
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.dailyyoga.inc&hl=en
[https://perma.cc/JSK4-8FP7].
96. See Water Alert, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/water-alertdrinking-water/id787142696?mt=8 [https://perma.cc/65ZL-JRMD].
97. See
Self-Help
for
Anxiety
Management,
ITUNES,
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/self-help-for-anxiety-management/id666767947?mt=8
[https://perma.cc/KD7P-ZTYM]; see also Kristen Fischer, Best Anxiety Apps of
2018, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.healthline.com/health/anxiety/topiphone-android-apps# [https://perma.cc/H7JM-ME4Z].
98. For example, one of the most popular dating apps, Tinder, suggests nearby
See
Tinder,
GOOGLEPLAY,
“matches.”
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.tinder&hl=en
[https://perma.cc/MMS2-SZX9].
99. See generally Stacy Cowley, Banks and Retailers Are Tracking How You
Type,
Swipe
and
Tap,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/business/behavioral-biometrics-bankssecurity.html [https://perma.cc/BQ4P-KDH8].
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Pokémon Go, 100 attracted criticisms for accessing users’ email
accounts, photos, stored data, and login information. 101 Similar
outrage occurred when it was discovered that the Uber app was
continuing to collect information about its users’ location by running
in the background even while those users were not actively using the
app. 102 Social networking sites also serve as a repository for various
types of sensitive data—they not only gather information that users
voluntarily provide, such as their date of birth, where they live, and
their employment and education history, but also generate novel and
unique forms of data about users, such as information about the
composition of and changes to their social networks. 103
These technologies and platforms, which generate and collect novel
forms of data, are often exempt from the heightened legal obligations
placed on entities that process sensitive data. 104 Take, for example,
data about social networking activities, which can be readily
associated with other types of information considered to be sensitive.
In one study that analyzed the “Facebook Like,” which is “a
mechanism used by Facebook users to express their positive
association with . . . online content,” researchers developed a
predictive model that managed to discover sensitive information

100. See Mike Sonders, Pokémon Go Daily Revenue: On the Decline, but There’s
MEDIUM
(Dec.
7,
2016),
Good
News,
https://medium.com/@sm_app_intel/pok%C3%A9mon-go-daily-revenue-on-thedecline-but-theres-still-good-news-9f9b9b2b8d7 [https://perma.cc/T6E7-2P3T] (“For
a couple of months after its launch, when looking at combined revenue across both
iOS and Android U.S. smartphones, Pokémon GO was the top-grossing mobile game
by a clear margin.”).
101. See Laura Hudson, How to Protect Privacy While Using Pokémon Go and
Other
Apps,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/technology/personaltech/how-to-protectprivacy-while-using-pokemon-go-and-other-apps.html
[https://perma.cc/EW98JBSE].
102. See Jennifer Abel, EPIC Fail for Uber’s New Privacy Policy: FTC Asked to
Block “Deceptive Data Collection,” CONSUMER AFF. (June 23, 2015),
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/epic-fail-for-ubers-new-privacy-policy-ftcasked-to-block-deceptive-data-collection-062315.html [https://perma.cc/JU43-37C4].
103. See Susan B. Barnes, A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United
FIRST
MONDAY,
Sept.
4,
2006,
at
11,
States,
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/1394/1312 [https://perma.cc/2DAK-D5VH].
104. Although a variety of mobile apps and devices collect, process, and access
sensitive information, they are not necessarily subject to U.S. sectoral privacy laws.
For instance, apps that track people’s sleep schedules, exercise habits, diets, and
levels of water intake are not subject to HIPAA, which only applies to doctors,
hospitals, insurers, and their business associates. See generally Ohm, supra note 3, at
1131 (arguing that HIPAA “should be expanded to include any company possessing
sensitive health information,” including the developers of mobile apps).

Still
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about users, including their sexual orientation, ethnicity, and religious
and political beliefs. 105 To test the accuracy of the model, its
predictions were compared with sensitive information that the study
participants provided voluntarily. 106 In the end, the researchers were
able to develop a predictive algorithm that could make “guesses”
about a person’s sensitive data with a high degree of accuracy,
between 85% and 95%, merely from the Facebook Like data collected
about individuals. 107
The digital “identifiers” in a predictive profile, which may be
linked to a particular IP address, device, or browser, are another type
of data that does not fall into one of the traditionally-protected
categories of sensitive data. 108 There are at least two basic types of
profiles companies can create about an individual: predictive and
explicit. An explicit profile is created when a user registers with a
website and provides personally-identifying information; a predictive
profile is created through “inference from observing and collecting
user behavior over time, particularly by monitoring visited pages and
ads viewed or clicked on.” 109 A predictive profile can be made
explicit at a later point in time — when a user (about whom a
predictive profile already exists) creates an account on a website, the
predictive profile can be matched with the personally-identifying
information the user provides to create an explicit profile.110
Furthermore, platforms, technology companies, and publishers have
the ability to cross-match data and create individual profiles using
these identifiers, and can thus follow a person’s activities across smart
devices. 111 While practical for users, cross-device tracking gives data

105. Michal Kosinki et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from
Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5802 (2013).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Poullet, supra note 20, at 11–13.
109. See GRATTON, supra note 86, at 412–13.
110. See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioral
00909/10/EN,
WP
171,
7
(June
22,
2010),
Advertising,

https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2010/wp171_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MYM-2RVY] (“The
profile based on analysis of the cookies stored on the terminal equipment of the data
subject can be enriched with aggregated data derived from the behavior of data
subjects who exhibit similar behavioral patterns in other contexts.”).
111. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING: AN FTC STAFF REPORT 1–2
(2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/cross-device-trackingfederal-trade-commission-staff-report-january-2017/ftc_crossdevice_tracking_report_1-23-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X4K-VY8S].
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collectors a bigger window into users’ lives. 112 A single smart device
effectively stores data on one’s health, finances, and location in the
same place, and each smart device may be linked with any number of
other smart devices.
Another example of a new form of data that can be used to identify
an individual is web-browsing history, or the record of webpages a
person visits over the Internet. Researchers in one study were able to
identify individuals with a high degree of accuracy by combining their
browsing histories with auxiliary public data. 113 As the authors of that
study noted, “browsing histories contain tell-tale marks of
identity.” 114 Because a person is more likely to click on links shared
by their specific contacts in a social network, in more than seven out
of ten cases, the researchers were able to identify the “owner” of a
browsing history by comparing it with the accounts that person
follows on social media. 115
The reality that web browsing history can reveal personal
information about users matches anecdotes and survey evidence that
suggest individuals consider their web browsing history to be a type of
sensitive data. 116 A person’s browsing histories can contain sensitive
information about his or her health, including any stigmatizing
medical conditions they might have. After being counseled by a
health care professional about a sexually-transmitted disease, for
example, many people seek health information related to their
medical condition on the Internet. 117 Several studies have found that
most Internet users disapprove of advertisers having access to records
of their online behavior in order to market products and target
advertisements to them. 118 This further suggests that most people

112. Id.
113. Jessica Su et al., De-Anonymizing Web Browsing Data with Social Networks,
26 PROC. INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 1261, 1268 (2017).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Ori Heffetz & Katrina Ligett, Privacy and Data-Based Research, 28 J.
ECON. PERSP. 75 (2014); see, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is
Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html [https://perma.cc/9EQWLKSA] (interviewing an AOL customer who was shocked to hear that AOL had
saved three months’ worth of her web search history).
117. See generally Veronique Verhoeven et al., Everything You Always Wanted to
Know About HPV (but Could Not Ask Your Doctor), 81 PATIENT EDUC. &
COUNSELING 101 (2010).
118. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Privacy and Modern Advertising: Most U.S.

Internet Users Want “Do Not Track” to Stop Collection of Data About Their Online
Activities, 2012 AMSTERDAM PRIVACY CONFERENCE 1, 2 (2012); JOSEPH TUROW ET
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consider their web searches to be private, sensitive information and
would approve of some legal protections to that effect.
A final example of data that should be fully afforded legal
protections as a category of sensitive information is data about
movements and locations generated through mobile device tracking.
Examining how a person’s physical location changes throughout the
day can reveal a detailed profile of that person’s life. Several states in
the United States have already decided that this sort of “tracking”
warrants protection. 119 Additionally, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Jones understood that sensitive information can be readily
inferred from real-time tracking of a person’s movements and
location:
Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably
private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure:
trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting,
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and
on. 120
Because of advances in surveillance technology, this type of
tracking data provides a wide window into a person’s life, revealing
sensitive information about him or her that simply would not have
been possible to obtain, or would be prohibitively expensive to do so,
just a couple of decades ago. 121 The underlying justification for giving
additional protection to this type of information is that “the
incremental privacy threat posed by the government’s acquisition of
information increases as more information is obtained . . . .” 122 As
the D.C. Circuit Court explained in United States v. Maynard:

AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT
ENABLE IT 3 (2009) (“Contrary to what many marketers claim, most adult Americans

(66%) do not want marketers to tailor advertisements to their interests.”); Lymari
Morales, U.S. Internet Users Ready to Limit Online Tracking for Ads, GALLUP (Dec.
21, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145337/Internet-Users-Ready-Limit-OnlineTracking-Ads.aspx [https://perma.cc/MUM6-LE8G].
119. California, New Hampshire, and Maine require law enforcement officials to
have a warrant for cell phone location tracking. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (2015);
16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644–A (2009).
120. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (quoting People v. Weaver,
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
121. Id.
122. Matthew B. Krugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of
Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV.
205, 205 (2015); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012).
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Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a
story not told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any
of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of a
person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a
gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store
tells a different story. 123
Moreover, as with other types of data, location data can be
combined with other datasets to identify specific individuals: “All
kinds of information can be connected to a geographic location, such
as financial data, health data and other consumer behavioural
data.” 124 Even away from personal devices, new ways of tracking
people are being developed. For instance, billboards with small
cameras can identify passers-by, and roadside billboards will soon use
mobile location information to better target advertisements to
drivers. 125
This past section has discussed the proliferation of novel forms of
data that tend to be exempt from existing laws and lists of “sensitive”
information. Across the United States and the European Union,
these developments will require lawmakers to constantly reevaluate
and expand the list of information that is deemed worthy of
heightened legal protection. This is one of several challenges to the
design of privacy and data protection laws that can withstand the test
of time. Turning to another key obstacle, the following section
describes how the combination of “non-sensitive” pieces of
information and other kinds of publicly-available data can be used to
uniquely identify individuals or reveal sensitive information about
them. It also shows how the proliferation of massive, open datasets,
combined with advanced analytics, blurs the distinction between
sensitive and non-sensitive data that has long been the heart of law
and policymaking in privacy and data protection.

123. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
124. Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion on Geolocation Services on Smart
81/11/EN,
WP
185,
3
(May
16,
2011),
Mobile
Devices,
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2011/wp185_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ22-LQPW].
125. See Sydney Ember, See that Billboard? It May See You, Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/business/media/see-thatbillboard-it-may-see-you-too.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MEJ2-M7PG].
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B. Uncovering Sensitive Data Through Re-Identification
Various types of data that have tended not to be considered
identifiable or sensitive in isolation can, in practice, be used to
uniquely identify a person, to reveal sensitive information about
them, and lead to significant privacy harms. Indeed, the boundaries
between different categories of information are becoming
increasingly blurred today. To many, the notion that we should assign
the label of “personally-identifiable information” to some data points
and not to others has become “outdated.” 126 Modern technologies
and data analytic techniques allow sensitive information about
individuals to be discerned from publicly-available or “open”
datasets 127 that continuously increase in size and number.128
Examples of these types of datasets range from user-generated
reviews on websites such as Google or Yelp (which link a person to
certain geographic locations, travel destinations, tastes, and financial
means), to educational records from massive open online courses
released by providers such as edX. 129 The expanding volume of data
that exists across various channels and platforms and has become
accessible to the public is thus challenging pre-determined categories
of sensitive data. 130
Researchers have shown that seemingly unrelated datasets can be
aggregated to link publicly-available data about a person to that
person’s identity or to sensitive information about him or her. Using
a method known as data linking or data fusion, which brings together
data from various sources, 131 any piece of information can become
identifying when combined with other bits of information. 132 As

126. George R. Milne et al., Information Sensitivity Typology: Mapping the
Degree and Type of Risk Consumers Perceive in Personal Data Sharing, 51 J.

CONSUMER AFF. 133, 134–36 (2016) (“[T]he PII/non-PII distinction is meaningless
anyway, given the ability of current reidentification algorithms to link seemingly
innocuous data into something personally identifiable.”).
127. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 155 (2013).
128. See, e.g., Jon P. Daries et al., Privacy, Anonymity, and Big Data in the Social
Sciences, 57 COMM. ACM 56, 58 (2014) (pointing out that “[a]s with open source
code and openly licensed content, support for open data has been steadily building”
because of its “tremendous potential across the scientific disciplines to facilitate
greater transparency through replication and faster innovation through novel
analyses”).
129. Id. at 59.
130. See Gratton, supra note 7, at 164.
131. See BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 4.
132. See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and Security: Myths and
Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable Information”, 53 COMM. ACM 24, 26 (2010); see
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Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove explain, “technologists
can take information that appears on its face to be non-identifiable
and turn it into identifiable data.” 133 In other words, the anonymity
of the owners of sensitive information can be unmasked through
techniques that re-identify people in so-called de-identified
datasets. 134 As a 2014 White House Report on big data pointed out,
“personally identifiable information can be derived or inferred from
datasets that do not even include personal identifiers.”135
Anticipating these developments over twenty years ago, Joel
Reidenberg and Paul Schwartz noted:
The ability of information technology to combine and share data
makes impossible any abstract noncontextual, evaluation of the
impact of disclosing a given piece of personal information. The
impact of bureaucratic use of personal information, whether merely
personal or highly sensitive, depends on the means of processing, the
kinds of databases linked together, and the ends to which
information will be used. 136

One of the most widely-cited examples of data-linking and reidentification comes from a study of the Netflix Prize. Netflix
publicly released a dataset with nearly 1.5 million ratings given by
500,000 of its subscribers — this was to crowdsource improvements to
the algorithm Netflix uses to predict how users rate films, and thus

generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).
133. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011).
134. See BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 8 (“When data is initially linked to an

individual or device, some privacy-protective technology seeks to remove this
linkage, or ‘de-identify’ personally identifiable information — but equally effective
techniques exist to pull the pieces back together through ‘re-identification.’”). For
conceptual definitions of and distinctions between anonymous data, explicit
identifier, and de-identified data, see Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often
Identify People Uniquely 6–7 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper
No. 3, 2000). According to Professor Latanya Sweeney, “[a] common incorrect belief
is that removing all explicit identifiers such as name, address and phone number from
the data renders the result anonymous.” Id. For the definitional distinction between
anonymity and privacy, see Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of
Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 693–94 (2015) (“Although both anonymity and
privacy prevent others from gaining access to a piece of personal information, they do
so in opposite ways: Privacy involves hiding the information, whereas anonymity
involves hiding what makes it personal.”).
135. BIG DATA, supra note 82, at 8.
136. JOEL R. REIDENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND
ONLINE
SERVICES:
REGULATORY
RESPONSES
9
(1998),
http://www.paulschwartz.net/pdf/onlinesvcs_schwartz-reidenberg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PHZ4-VRS6].
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better tailor film suggestions to users. 137 Although names and
account names were removed, the dataset included information on all
the films each user watched, the ratings they gave, and the date each
rating was given. 138 Comparing the ratings in the Netflix data with
ratings that were posted by known users on the Internet Movie
Database (IMDb), researchers were able to specifically identify
several individuals in the Netflix dataset and have access to their
viewing histories. 139
The practice of de-identifying data by removing explicit identifiers
such as names, addresses, or phone numbers has been shown to be
“not sufficient to render data anonymous because combinations of
attributes often combine uniquely to re-identify individuals.”140
Another well-known study re-identified people in a de-identified
hospital dataset that contained their diagnoses, procedures, and
medications using publicly-available voter registration lists. 141 The
study concluded that 87% of the U.S. population could likely be
identified by their unique combination of zip code, gender, and date
of birth, while more than half (53%) could be identified by their
unique combination of city/town/municipality, gender, and date of
birth. 142
Data that is frequently collected by social networking sites can also
be combined with ancillary data to identify or reveal sensitive
information about people. In one study, researchers used facial
recognition technology to link an image of a person’s face to personal
information about the same person that could be found online,
including that person’s Social Security Number. 143 Researchers were
able to uncover the identity of an anonymous or unidentified person,
and even retrieve sensitive information about the person in real time,
simply by using social networking profiles, search queries to data
aggregation websites such as Spokeo.com, statistical analysis, data
mining, and facial recognition techniques. 144 It is particularly of note
that the researchers were able to identify even those persons who
137. See THE NETFLIX PRIZE RULES, http://www.netflixprize.com/assets/rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JS66-VEAA].
138. See id.
139. See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of
Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111, 121 (2008).
140. See Sweeney, supra note 134, at 2.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., Face Recognition and Privacy in the Age of
Augmented Reality, 6 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 1, 10–11 (2014).
144. See id. at 10.
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attempted to maintain anonymity online, by, for example, using a
pseudonym on a dating website, as well as passers-by in the “offline”
world. 145 Studies such as these demonstrate the potential of
technology, much of which is readily available on the market, to
pinpoint and collect sensitive information about people.
This Article has thus far examined how advancements in
technology and the proliferation of big data have rendered the
traditional “categorical” distinction between sensitive and nonsensitive data as outdated, and a practically ineffective tool for law
and policymaking. This is because innocuous-seeming bits of
information can be linked with publicly-available datasets to reveal
private, personal, sensitive information. The final part of this section
addresses another way in which the “categorical” approach to
prioritizing sensitive data falls short of providing effective privacy
protections: the fact that the sensitivity of a given piece of data is
contingent upon the context in which it is used.
Without
acknowledging the role that context plays in data sensitivity,
lawmakers in both the European Union and United States will
continue to struggle to properly protect data subjects’ privacy
interests.
C. How the Context of Data Use Affects Sensitivity
Another practical challenge to the prioritization of sensitive data
involves the relationship between the context or purpose of
information use and its level of sensitivity. Relying on type, nature,
or category of information as a guide for determining data sensitivity
promotes the view that all pieces of information that fall under a
given category are equally sensitive at all times — but this may not
always be the case. 146 The level of risk associated with any piece of
data is not entirely dependent upon its nature or type, but is usually
the product of several variables: “situation-specific circumstances, the
intentions of the parties involved, the kind of information being
sought and the way it is processed.” 147 In other words, personal

145. See id. at 7.
146. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV.
119, 119 (2004).
147. Gratton, supra note 7, at 146 n.212 (“Other relevant variables may include the
historical context, the particular type of technology at stake, the political
environment, the nature of the information within a given context, and the
vulnerability of the individual . . . . [Also,] the long-term as well as the short-term
impact on the individual affected, on what terms the information is shared, the terms
of further dissemination, the purpose of disclosure, the expectations of the individual,
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information may become more or less sensitive, in terms of the
potential harm it can cause to individuals, depending on the
context. 148 Simply prioritizing certain “categories” of information
without taking into account the context of use might be too blunt an
approach to protect data subjects’ privacy. This approach may not
only inhibit benign or beneficial uses of sensitive data, but also fail to
recognize the harmful uses of data that is deemed non-sensitive in
different contexts.
Indeed, numerous experimental studies have demonstrated that
public perceptions about information sensitivity are shaped by the
For instance,
context in which information is disclosed. 149
demographic information such as name, email, mobile phone number,
and mailing address are typically perceived as low in sensitivity.150
But in the purchasing context, when demographic information is
combined with financial information such as credit card and pin
numbers, the same demographic information is perceived as highly
sensitive. 151 Likewise, in job hunting contexts, when demographic
information is combined with personal identification information such
as identification photos, it is perceived to be highly sensitive. 152
Moreover, a wide range of sensitivity levels can be found within the
same “category” of data. For instance, the term health data may refer
to a diagnosis of a common illness, such as a cold or the flu, as well as
to a serious disease associated with stigmatization, 153 but to classify all
information about one’s health as of the same sensitivity level would
be a potentially dangerous oversimplification of the data. 154

the identity of the recipient, whether the recipient has an interest in knowing the
information disclosed, etc.”).
148. Id. at 164 n.318, 181 (noting that the appearance of an individual’s name on a
company Intranet page has fewer privacy implications than the appearance of the
same name on a “blacklist” related to credit ratings. In the context of consumer
privacy, the sale of one’s entire consumer history (including information of an
“intimate” nature) would be fundamentally more harmful than a telemarketing call
based on newspaper subscription records.).
149. See, e.g., David L. Mothersbaugh et al., Disclosure Antecedents in an Online
Service Context: The Role of Sensitivity of Information, 15 J. SERV. RES. 76, 90–91
(2012).
150. Id. at 94.
151. See id.; Shu Yang & Kanliang Wang, The Influence of Information Sensitivity
Compensation on Privacy Concern and Behavioral Intention, 40 ACM SIGMIS 38,
38 (2009).
152. Yang & Wang, supra note 151, at 38.
153. Sensitive Data, supra note 23, at 8.
154. Cf. id.
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As noted earlier, a key factor in determining whether any given
piece of information is sensitive is the level of risk associated with
it. 155 It follows that before any piece of information can be deemed
sensitive, it must be established that its exposure would be harmful to
the data subject. But demonstrating the existence of such harm has
been an elusive task, which has proven difficult for a variety of
reasons, some judicial or constitutional and others empirical. 156
Professor Éloïse Gratton distinguishes between three different
types of data use by data controllers and processors: positive (uses
that benefit the data subject), negative (uses that harm the data
subject), and neutral (uses that neither benefit nor harm the data
subject, but typically benefit the entity handling or analyzing the
data). 157 Importantly, Gratton’s distinctions are not between the
category, nature, or type of information itself, but between different
uses of information. 158 More specifically, she distinguishes between
uses that create benefits, lead to harms, or do not affect the data
subject at all. 159 From this standpoint, the category of the data
remains constant; it is the uses or the ends towards which the data is
put that alter its sensitivity level. 160 This view thus acknowledges that
the same piece of information can lead to harms if used in some ways
but lead to benefits if used in others, or might even remain neutral in
some circumstances.
Consider, for example, different uses of data within the industry of
web analytics, which seeks to understand and monetize user’s online
behaviors. Potential positive benefits for data subjects include more
personalized services, products, and advertisements, while uses that
may be neutral include those that allow an organization to develop
new tools or services. 161 Yet, there are several potential harms
stemming from the web data analytics:
One could claim that providing only certain customers with specials
may trigger a risk of objective harm to other customers
(discrimination). Others may find that, as with targeted advertising,
this may limit the various choices offered to consumers. This means

155. See, e.g., Beldad et al., supra note 2 (defining sensitive health information by
the amount of risk it carries in the event of disclosure).
156. See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 4, at 161 (explaining why it is so difficult
to establish the existence of informational privacy harms in the courts — because
privacy is conceptually tied to the complex notions of dignity and autonomy).
157. GRATTON, supra note 86, at 416.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

302

[Vol. XLVI

that whether information used for analytic purposes is considered
personal [or sensitive] will depend on the exact use and whether this
specific use may cause objective harm to an individual. 162

If data controllers automatically or by default prioritize certain
types or categories of data without considering how that data is used,
they likely ignore how the benefits and risks of the same piece of data
can differ from one context to another. In other words, the likelihood
and severity of the harms or benefits of data processing depend upon
how data is used, as well as on the context in which it is processed.163
This feature of data processing and sensitivity-variability poses a
critical challenge for lawmakers who seek to design laws that can both
protect privacy and enhance beneficial data uses. Challenging as this
may be, however, it is vital to contend with in the face of a world in
which data is growing ever-more complex and ubiquitous.
III. RETHINKING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
This Article has thus far analyzed how policymakers in both the
United States and the European Union prioritize sensitive
information as a category, and discussed several practical challenges
with this approach. As the border between sensitive and nonsensitive information becomes increasingly blurry due to big data,
data linking, and re-identification capabilities, laws that prioritize
sensitive information based on category might leave data subjects
vulnerable to significant risks. Without some degree of protections
for non-sensitive data categories, many privacy threats will remain —
given the rapid pace of change in the data and informational
landscape, risk schemes around information sensitivity need to be reevaluated.
The practical challenges in prioritizing sensitive information are, in
some ways, attributable to changes in technology. Dealing with
technology that is constantly evolving has long been a key challenge
for data protection laws. 164 Companies and governments retain vast
amounts of information on people by connecting different data sets
162. Id. at 417.
163. See Nissenbaum, supra note 146, at 137–38 (“[W]hether a particular action is
determined a violation of privacy is a function of several variables, including the
nature of the situation, or context; the nature of the information in relation to that
context; the roles of agents receiving information; their relationships to information
subjects; on what terms the information is shared by the subject; and the terms of
further dissemination.”).
164. See, e.g., Spiros Simitis, Privacy—An Endless Debate?, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1989, 2000 (2010) (discussing Europe’s attempts to pass omnibus laws as a “means to
secure both a broad and reliable way to regulate the use of personal data”).
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and data points to create digital dossiers. 165 Today, there is no escape
from leaving traces that can be recorded. 166 Moreover, because reidentification can be achieved through publicly-available tools,
measures aimed at enhancing privacy, such as blurring facial images
in databases or relying on individual opt-ins, may be ineffective.167
Although laws that regulate the collection of a single type of sensitive
data about users may be effective at mitigating well-known privacy
risks, the collection of this data en masse is generating new risks.
The problems associated with prioritizing sensitive data
categorically are exacerbated by the fact that people share and
generate an increasing amount of data through various applications,
platforms, technological accessories, and wearable devices — all of
which track multiple aspects of users’ daily activities. 168 Reliance on
self-tracking as a means of self-improvement or self-reflection, and
the concomitant desire to “quantify” oneself, 169 may continue to grow
into the future. New technologies will inevitably be developed to
meet this demand, producing new types and greater quantities of
data, at least some of which will entail a high degree of risk and thus
deserve heightened legal protection. These trends have, and certainly
will continue, to fundamentally alter the boundaries of what
information people consider sensitive and private.
The lists of special information in the European Union and
information subject to heightened obligations under U.S. law, both
discussed in this Article, are notable not only for what they include
but also for what they leave out. Search queries, web browsing
history, and contacts on social networking sites are examples of types
of data that have tended not to be regarded as highly sensitive or
risky, and have received less protection than other categories of

165. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393–96, 1400–09 (2001)

(highlighting the skepticism with which databases have historically been viewed, and
explaining the interaction between public and private databases, the marketplace for
information, and the individualized targeting that “cyberspace” affords).
166. Patrick Breyer, Telecommunications Data Retention and Human Rights: The
Compatibility of Blanket Traffic Data Retention with the ECHR, 11 EUR. L.J. 365,
370 (2005).
167. Acquisti et al., supra note 143, at 14 (“Blurring of facial images in databases,
k-anonymization of photos, or opt-ins, are ineffectual tools when re-identification can
be achieved through already publicly available data.”).
168. See, e.g., DEBORAH LUPTON, THE QUANTIFIED SELF: A SOCIOLOGY OF SELFTRACKING 2 (2016).
169. See generally id.
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information. 170 But, as demonstrated here, this “non-sensitive data”
can be used to identify or reveal sensitive information about a person,
such as their health conditions, sexual preferences, political
associations, and religious practices. 171
An unfathomable number of data points can be pooled together to
compile a profile for an individual within seconds.
These
advancements in technology have generated novel types of data,
which call into question the distinction between sensitive and nonThe increasing ease with which
sensitive information. 172
disaggregated bits of data from around the web can be swept up and
compiled into a single profile, linking presumably non-sensitive data
with sensitive data, should prompt legislators to recognize these
profiles as a new type of sensitive information deserving of stronger
protections. Adding these novel data types to the list of special
categories of information, however, would only be a first step.
As opposed to the categorical approach, the contextual approach
to data considers how the context in which information is used affects
its level of sensitivity. 173 This perspective shifts the focus away from
the category of data, avoiding the question of what categories are or
are not sensitive, to the manner of data use and its eventual
consequences. 174 Many risks may not be identified if the context of
disclosure is overlooked. 175 Uses of data that benefit the data subject,
regardless of the type of data in question, should not be subject to
processing restrictions, while uses of data that result in harms to the
data subject often should be. 176
Although it expanded the European Union’s list of categories of
sensitive information, the GDPR indicates a shift towards a

170. See Ohm, supra note 3, at 1142–44 (“[T]he Cable Privacy Protection Act
singles out subscription information in ways that seem overprotective when
compared to the fact that search queries and web history tend not to be protected.”).
171. See Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 139, at 123.
172. See id.
173. Nissenbaum, supra note 146, at 155.
174. Gratton, supra note 7, at 207 (advocating that information only qualifies as
personal if the way in which it is being used or collected — its context — creates a
risk of harm).
175. Id. at 163.
176. See generally id. Although Gratton’s framework sorts information into
personal and non-personal types, rather than sensitive and non-sensitive types, the
logic is essentially the same: based on the notion that the processing of some types of
information (i.e., personal or sensitive) should be subject to heightened regulations,
she argues that the context of data use (whether positive, negative, or neutral to the
data subject) is the determining factor in whether any given information processing is
deemed to involve personal information and, thus, ought to be considered risky.
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contextual approach to determine information sensitivity. 177 In their
advice paper, issued a year after the proposals for the GDPR were
made public, the Article 29 Working Party noted that several
Member States “believe that the context and/or the purpose of
processing should be taken into account when assessing the issue of
sensitivity.” 178 The Working Party also noted that one of the
shortcomings of the current categorizing approach, as embodied in
the 1995 Directive, is that a “closed list [of sensitive information] is
inflexible and unable to react to the context of processing as well as
new forms of processing which might occur in the course of ongoing
technological developments . . . .” 179
The issue of defining and protecting sensitive information has also
been subject to debate recently in the United States, especially after
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced a new
rule that Internet Service Providers, such as Comcast and AT&T,
need to require opt-in consent to collect and use sensitive
information, including “precise geo-location, financial information,
health information, children’s information, social security numbers,
web browsing history, app usage history, and the content of
Broadband firms challenged the FCC’s
communications.” 180
authority to impose this rule on them, 181 and President Donald
Trump signed a resolution to repeal the rule. 182 Resistance by
industry to regulations that would impose restrictions on the
collection and use of sensitive information may be another factor that
prompts lawmakers to rethink how to afford legal protections to these
types of information.

177. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 3, Recital 76.
178. Sensitive Data, supra note 23, at 10.
179. Id. at 13.
180. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Privacy Rules to Give
Broadband Consumers Increased Choice, Transparency and Security for Their
Personal Data (Oct. 27, 2016) (on file with author). Broadband customers were not
given a choice to not share this information with their service providers or to use
encryption. See also Natasha Duarte, Frequently Asked Questions: The FCC’s
Broadband Privacy Rule, CTR. DEM. & TECH. (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://cdt.org/blog/frequently-asked-questions-the-fccs-broadband-privacy-rule/
[https://perma.cc/F8MC-CCU3].
181. Digital Advertisers Battle over Online Privacy, ECONOMIST (Nov. 5, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21709584-escalating-fight-over-users-dataand-targeted-ads-digital-advertisers-battle-over-online
[https://perma.cc/F7PFJYPQ].
182. A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of
title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Federal Communications
Commission relating to ‘‘Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and
Other Telecommunications Services.” S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017).
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CONCLUSION
EU and U.S. information privacy laws have long relied on
categorical distinctions to set priorities regarding legal protections,
obligations, and restrictions on data processing activities. This
approach, based on the assumption that information that is sensitive
in nature tends to be associated with greater risks, remains at the core
of privacy laws on both continents. The effectiveness of this
approach, however, is steadily diminishing today as the long-standing
distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive information, which
was always on shaky ground, has all but collapsed. The exponential
rise in the kinds and amount of data about us that is being collected,
stored, and processed every day has brought about a reality in which a
just a couple of innocuous data points are all that is needed to
uniquely identify a person or to reveal sensitive information about
them.
Classifying data according to its nature or type and prioritizing data
considered sensitive is an essential first step in risk assessment — but
this step is only the beginning. Relying entirely on the sensitivity
level of a piece of data to determine the risks associated with it will
fall short of adequately protecting data subjects’ privacy. Data
controllers and regulators must therefore consider other factors, in
addition to the category of data or its sensitivity level, when
determining the risks posed by data processing. There is certainly a
need to interpret sensitive information broadly, and for laws to
extend protection to newly-emerging types of data that can uniquely
identify or reveal sensitive information about individuals. But it is
also imperative for law and policymakers to go beyond the categorybased regulation of sensitive information if they are to properly
protect privacy. Moving forward, policymakers should prioritize
sensitive information understood broadly, while also simultaneously
protecting against the risks posed by harmful contexts of data use.
A worst-case scenario is that the legal prioritization of certain
categories of information deemed special or sensitive may
inadvertently lead to the neglect of risks associated with other types
of data processing. It is not too much of a stretch to say that all data
may be sensitive, or that there is a minimum level of sensitivity
present in every piece of data. No data can ever be entirely
disassociated from risk and harm. To believe otherwise would be to
fail to look beyond the nature of data.

